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Two of the most important values of modern democracies are political equality and freedom of 
expression. In the narrowest sense, political equality is realized by the “one person – one vote” rule, 
but the principle means more than this: it also involves, that everybody must have a real opportunity 
to influence the outcome of the elections, and everybody must have the possibility to seek after 
supporters. In the same time members of the public are entitled to receive information about the 
rival arguments in order to be able to form a well-founded decision at the end of the campaign. This 
definition proves, that freedom of expression is also inevitable in order to ensure a fair decision-
making process. 
In my paper I examine how the constitutional principle of political equality is presented in 
different European international law documents and in the practice of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR). I hypothesize that we can speak about a well-recognizable European approach 
towards campaign-financing and I examine whether this approach really prefers political equality, 
as opposed to the constitutional attitude of the Unites States, where freedom of expression prevails, 
when the two constitutional values collide. 
 Therefore in the first part of my paper I elaborate the idea of the “Europeanization” of norms 
on campaign financing, and I turn to the problems raised by these European “good practices”. 
Namely, I examine the attitude towards the collision of political equality and freedom of political 
speech. Then I shortly describe the relevant constitutional practice of the United States, which is 
often used as a sharp contrast. Finally I examine the Animal Defenders International decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights, which is often heralded as the European victory of political 
equality. As a conclusion, I find questionable, whether a blanket ban on corporate campaign-
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spending, which was at stake in this particular case, can in fact foster the realization of political 
equality. 
 
Preliminary Remarks: A European Regime of Campaign Financing? 
 
In my paper I examine how the constitutional principle of political equality is presented in different 
European international law documents and in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). I do this through focusing on the issues of campaign financing, especially on the 
problems of campaign spending and political advertising. 
At first glance it seems that there exists a distinct European approach towards the problem, which 
prefers political equality, as opposed to the approach of the Unites States, where freedom of 
expression prevails, when the two constitutional values collide. But a close examination of the 
relevant case-law shows that this statement is not convincing enough. Due to the limits of the 
current paper, I use the recent Animal Defenders International v. The United Kingdom decision, as 
a core example. 
I hypothesize that we can speak about a well-recognizable European approach towards 
campaign-financing. In the last decades a process of “Europeanisation” could be witnessed, and this 
process is characterized by a set of soft and hard law documents, issued by different institutions and 
bodies of the Council of Europe1 and the European Union (EU).2 The idea of interpreting these very 
diverse documents together might seem strange, but it is not unusual in the relevant literature. 
Behind this approach we can find the consideration that the “European legal regime” does 
not exclusively refer to the legal system of the EU; the process of Europeanisation does not stop at 
the borders of the EU, and it has a very strong effect on the neighbouring countries. Thus, the 
dynamics of Europeanisation exceeds the narrow interpretation of the European integration.3 In 
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 Such as: Recommendation Rec(2003)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on common rules against 
corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns; Code of Good Practice in the Field of Political 
Parties by European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) CDL-AD(2009)002.; Guidelines 
and Report on the Financing of Political Parties by the Venice Commission CDL-INF (2001)8.; Opinion of the 
Prohibition of Financial Contributions to Political Parties From Foreign Sources adopted by the Venice Commission 
CDL-AD (2006)014. 
2
 See especially: Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003; 
Regulation (EC) No 1524/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2007 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding 
their funding; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2401 of 2 October 2015 on the content and 
functioning of the Register of European political parties and foundations. 
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 Van Biezen I. – Molenaar F. The Europeanisation of Party Politics? Competing Regulatory Paradigms at the 
Supranational Level. West European Politics, 2012, 16 April, No. 3. p. 634. 
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many cases the institutions of the EU cooperate closely with the institutions of the Council of 
Europe, which encourages the spread of the ideals of campaign financing.4 
 This interpretation of Europeanisation is closely related to that, which can be described as 
the regional impact of states with strong democratic traditions.5 For instance, the democratic 
transition of the countries in Central – Europe was not fostered solely by the EU, but by other 
regional forms of cooperation, too.6 I agree with Timus, who states that however the EU has the 
leading role in the story of the European integration, when it comes to the principles of political 
campaigns, the influence of the Council of Europe, and especially that of the Venice Commission 
cannot be neglected.7 
 
The European “Good Practices” on Campaign Financing 
 
So, the various guidelines and recommendations issued by the different bodies of the Council of 
Europe, and the legal regulations of the European Union together construct a distinct set of rules. 
This can be expanded with the principles, which follow from the practice of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR).8 These documents and the respective practice of the Court construct 
together something, which can be called as the European “good practices” of campaign finance. 
These good practices seem to be determined to guarantee the realisation of political equality. The 
collision of the idea of political equality and freedom of expression can be detected especially in 
connection with two issues: these are the problems of private contributions and campaign spending. 
Considering the limits of this paper, here I choose to focus only on these proposals. 
 The problem of private financing is a controversial and complex one. Many European 
documents urge establishing financial caps on private donations and explicit prohibition on 
contributions from industrial or commercial corporations.9 The argumentation behind these 
solutions is to prevent the distorting influence of well-endowed interests in the political 
competition. According to this argument, interested money, especially corporate money can 
monopolize the “marketplace of ideas” and undermine the fair competition among the rival political 
                                                          
4
 Timus N. The Impact of Democracy Promotion in Party Financing in the East European Neighbourhood. European 
Integration Online Papers, 2010, No. 3. p. 6. 
5
 Whitehead L. Democratic Regions, Ostracism and Pariahs. In: Whitehead L. (ed.) The International Dimensions of 
Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 395-396. 
6
 Pridham G. The European Union, democratic conditionality and transnational party linkages: The case of Eastern 
Europe. In: Grugel J. (ed.) Democracy without Borders. Transnationalization and conditionality in new democracies. 
London and New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 59-60. 
7
 Walecki shares this approach: Walecki M. The Europeanization of Political Parties: Influencing the Regulations on 
Political Finance. EUI Working Papers, 2007, No. 29. p. 2. 
8
 Van Biezen I. – Molenaar F pp.639-641. 
9
 Van Biezen I. Financing political parties and election campaigns – Guidelines. Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
Publishing, 2003, p. 30. 
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forces. John Rawls described this phenomenon as a distortion of democracy, “a kind of regulated 
rivalry between economic classes and interest groups in which the outcome should properly depend 
on the ability and willingness of each to use its financial resources and skills, admittedly very 
unequal, to make its desires felt.”10 But, in the same time financial contributions may help 
strengthening the relationship between a political party or candidate and its electorate and, in 
addition, contributions can be understood as a form of expressing political support, thus a way of 
expressing political opinion. Hence the question arises, whether these limitations are acceptable 
forms of restricting freedom of expression. 
On the other hand, the documents on campaign financing often argue for limiting campaign 
spending in order to limit the importance of money in politics. Spending limits may be able to 
weaken the influence of money in politics, and eliminate the financial inequality among the 
competing parties. But limiting campaign-spending may restrict freedom of political speech. These 
spending limits may abridge the freedom of candidates and parties to express their political 
programmes, hence narrow the chance for voters to gather more information about a political issue. 
Moreover, limits on spending by third parties (restrictions on parallel campaigns) may also burden 
the freedom of expression of private individuals who wish to support a particular party or candidate. 
All of the above described measures have the same ultimate aim: to guarantee the idea of 
political equality. Political equality in this sense means more than the well-known principle of “one 
person, one vote”. It involves, that everybody must have real opportunity to influence the outcome 
of the elections, and everybody must have the possibility to seek after supporters. In the same time 
members of the public are entitled to receive information about the rival arguments in order to be 
able to form a well-founded decision at the end of the campaign.11 These arguments highlight the 
crucial importance of the freedom of expression during campaign-periods. Without this freedom, 
the fairness of political competition cannot be ensured. But all of these above mentioned values can 
evaporate if well-endowed interests have the opportunity to monopolize the “marketplace of ideas” 
and undermine the fair competition among the rival political viewpoints. But, while these limits aim 
to guarantee equality, they may restrict freedom of expression, as well. Therefore the real question 
is how to balance between these two, competing principles. 
It is often argued that the European and the American approach offer different answers to 
this question.12 As the relevant manual published by the Council of Europe points out, the 
“European approach has been to accept restrictions to campaign expenditure on the grounds that 
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 Rawls J. Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 361. 
11
 Dawood Y. Democracy, Power and The Supreme Court: Campaign Finance Reform in Comparative Context. 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2006, No. 2. p. 280. 
12
 The different attitudes are strongly highlighted by Jacob Rowbottom. Rowbottom J. Animal Defenders International: 
Speech, Spending, and a Change of Direction in Strasbourg. Journal of Media Law, 2013, No. 5. pp. 1-13. 
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freedom of expression does not entail the freedom to use wealth to get the less prosperous to listen 
to one’s views. In addition, restrictions on campaign expenditures can be justified with a view to 
controlling the potentially disruptive role of money in politics.” While European campaign finance 
is moving towards more restrictive regulation of campaign expenditure, this practice is in sharp 
contrast with the more permissive tradition in the United States, where spending by candidates is 
not limited (except for presidential candidates who voluntarily accept spending limits in exchange 
for public subsidies).”13 
 
Equality in the Constitutional Practice of the United States 
 
This myth of the so-called American approach, which so infamously prefers freedom of 
expression to the ideal of political equality, roots in the Buckley v. Valeo case.14 In Buckley the 
Supreme Court examined the Federal Election Campaign Act and struck down the limits on 
campaign spending. While arguing for the unconstitutionality of the spending limits, the judges 
phrased the well-known anti-egalitarian argument, according to which “the ancillary governmental 
interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of 
elections serves to justify the … expenditure ceiling. But the concept that government may restrict 
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment…” But, as Ronald Dworkin highlighted, in the same decision the 
Court upheld the contribution limits, and “it can be justified only on the assumption that Congress 
has the power to limit the political activity of some people in order to safeguard the citizen equality 
of others.”15 
Other decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court underline more, how significant the ideal of 
political equality became in its practice. Stellar example of this development is the Austin 
decision,16 in which the Court argued that a regulation, which banned campaign-expenditures by 
profit-oriented corporations, could be justified, as it aimed a “different type of corruption in the 
political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form.” 
A weak majority overturned this decision recently in the Citizens United case17, stressing 
that “Austin interferes with the “open marketplace” of ideas protected by the First Amendment.” 
This argument is based on the instrumentalist justification of freedom of expression. According to 
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 Van Biezen p. 29. 
14
 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976). 
15
 Dworkin R. Political Equality. In Dworkin R. Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge – 
London: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 373. 
16
 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652 (1990). 
17
 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310 (2010). 
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the justices, freedom of speech makes it possible for the voters to gather information about the 
different viewpoints of the candidates, thus, guarantees the possibility of well-informed decision-
making. Therefore, any regulation which limits the quantity of available speech on the marketplace 
of ideas endangers the decision-making process. In this sense even the ideas of corporations may 
prove valuable. 
In the same time Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion stated that “the interests of 
nonresident corporations may be fundamentally adverse to the interests of local voters. 
Consequently, when corporations grab up the prime broadcasting slots on the eve of an election, 
they can flood the market with advocacy that bears “little or no correlation” to the ideas of natural 
persons or to any broader notion of the public good. The opinions of real people may be 
marginalized.” Thus, those who argue for the ban on corporate spending, state that motivated 
corporate interests may be able to monopolize the marketplace of ideas, hence making it 
increasingly difficult for those with lesser financial resources to transmit their messages to the 
voters. 
 
ECtHR: in Favour of Political Equality? 
 
The problem of campaign spending is well-known in the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), as well. Last time in the Animal Defenders International v. The United 
Kingdom case18 examined the Court the interference of a contracting state’s, namely the United 
Kingdom’s law on political activity with Article 10 of the Convention. The facts of the case were, 
as it follows, that a small civil organisation, an NGO, the Animal Defenders International, which 
had the aim of protecting the animals from abuse intended to begin a campaign under the name of 
“My Mate is a Primate” and wished to broadcast a short (20 seconds) television ad as part of this 
campaign. The British broadcasting authority found, that the ADI’s aims were “wholly or mainly 
political in nature” and prohibited the advertising under the Communications Act (enacted in 2003) 
which in its Article 321 prohibits broadcasting almost every form of political ads, not just in 
campaign periods but beyond those periods, and not just by public broadcasting services but by 
private broadcasters, too, in every kind of broadcast media. In brief, these rules can be considered as 
blanket ban on political advertising in broadcast media. The ultimate aim of the Act was to protect 
the integrity of the political debate in the society. Under this the legislator meant to prevent the 
distorting effect of huge amounts of money on the political decision-making process. 
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After the decision of the broadcasting authority the Animal Defenders issued proceedings 
seeking a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act and stated that 
the full prohibition on paid political advertising on television and radio was incompatible with 
Article 10 of the Convention. The Animal Defenders argued that the full prohibition was too widely 
defined and banned communication which should be protected under the Convention, so the ban 
must have been considered as disproportionate. But the British courts rejected the arguments of the 
NGO. In their decisions they stated that “the rationale for the prohibition was to preserve the 
integrity of the democratic process by ensuring that the broadcast media were not distorted by 
wealthy interests in favour of a certain political agenda”19 Baroness Hale, member of the House of 
Lords added that “our democracy is based upon more than one person one vote. It is based on the 
view that each person has equal value.” After these antecedents the NGO started proceedings in the 
ECtHR against the United Kingdom. 
A highly divided Court concluded that the norms in question did not interfere with Article 
10 of the Convention. In its argumentation the majority at first stated that the “essence of 
democracy is to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and debated…” and that 
“situation whereby a powerful economic or political group in society is permitted to obtain a 
position of dominance over the audiovisual media … undermines the fundamental role of freedom 
of expression in a democratic society”. Based on these principles the judges refused those 
arguments which called into question the proportionality of the rules at stake, stating that the 
prohibition was circumscribed to address the precise risk of distortion the State wished to avoid and 
that the rules in question were “considered to go to the heart of the democratic process.”20 
Paraphrasing the Animal Defenders’ argument that “the Government could have narrowed the 
scope of the prohibition to allow advertising by social advocacy groups outside of electoral 
periods”, the Court accepted the conclusions of the British judges that a less restricting rule would 
raise the risk that wealthy bodies with political agendas were able to circumvent the norms with the 
help of social advocacy groups created for that particular purpose. The Court also remarked that the 
Contracting States should be allowed to consider their own democratic visions when they regulate 




This decision of the ECtHR was heralded as the one, in which the European judges avoided 
the very pitfall, which trapped their American colleagues, and as a European victory of political 
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 Ibid, [17]. 
20
 Ibid, [117]. 
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equality.21 While in fact they did not do anything else but allowed a blanket ban on political speech 
– during and also outside campaign period. It is highly questionable, whether this approach could 
help to guarantee political equality. As I have already elaborated, political equality also ensures that 
everybody has the real opportunity to influence the outcome of the elections, or putting it 
differently: everybody must have real possibility to spread his or her views regarding to political 
questions. On the other hand, political equality means that everybody is entitled to receive 
information about the different, rival arguments in order to be able to form a considered decision at 
the end of the campaign. This blanket ban, which does not differentiate between corporations with 
deep pockets, which try and influence the elections in favour of purely economic interests and 
small, single issue groups, surely does not foster the realization of political equality in this sense. 
  
                                                          
21
 See the early comment by Jacob Rowbottom: “The decision in Animal Defenders International has come as a surprise 
to me, but – and many will disagree with me on this point – it is a pleasant surprise. It is one in which the Strasbourg 
Court has moved away from its earlier jurisprudence and emphasized the importance of insulating political debate from 
the inequalities in wealth.” Jacob Rowbottom: Surprise ruling? Strasbourg upholds the ban on paid political ads on TV 
and Radio. Available: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/04/22/jacob-rowbottom-a-surprise-ruling-strasbourg-





• Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652 (1990). 
• Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976). 
• Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310 (2010). 
• Code of Good Practice in the Field of Political Parties by European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) CDL-AD(2009)002.; 
• Commission Delegated Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2401 of 2 October 2015 on the 
content and functioning of the Register of European political parties and foundations. 
• Dawood Yasmin: Democracy, Power and The Supreme Court: Campaign Finance Reform in 
Comparative Context. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2006, No. 2. 
• Dworkin Ronald: Political Equality. In Dworkin Ronald: Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and 
Practice of Equality. Cambridge – London: Harvard University Press, 2000. 
• Guidelines and Report on the Financing of Political Parties by the Venice Commission 
CDL-INF (2001)8.; 
• Judgment of European Court of Human Rights, Case: 48876/08 Animal Defenders 
International v. The United Kingdom. 
• Opinion of the Prohibition of Financial Contributions to Political Parties From Foreign 
Sources adopted by the Venice Commission CDL-AD (2006)014.; 
• Pridham Geoffrey: The European Union, democratic conditionality and transnational party 
linkages: The case of Eastern Europe. In: Grugel Jean (ed.): Democracy without Borders. 
Transnationalization and conditionality in new democracies. London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999. 
• Rawls John: Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005. 
• Recommendation Rec(2003)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on common 
rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns; 
• Regulation (EC) No 1524/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
December 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing 
political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding; 
• Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
November 2003; 
• Rowbottom Jacob: Animal Defenders International: Speech, Spending, and a Change of 
Direction in Strasbourg. Journal of Media Law, 2013, No. 5. 
10 
 
• Rowbottom Jacob: Surprise ruling? Strasbourg upholds the ban on paid political ads on TV 
and Radio. Available: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/04/22/jacob-rowbottom-a-
surprise-ruling-strasbourg-upholds-the-ban-on-paid-political-ads-on-tv-and-radio/ [viewed 
2016. 28 August] 
• Timus Natalia: The Impact of Democracy Promotion in Party Financing in the East 
European Neighbourhood. European Integration Online Papers, 2010, No. 3.  
• Van Biezen Ingrid – Molenaar Fransje: The Europeanisation of Party Politics? Competing 
Regulatory Paradigms at the Supranational Level. West European Politics, 2012, 16 April, 
No. 3. 
• Van Biezen Ingrid: Financing political parties and election campaigns – Guidelines. 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2003. 
• Walecki Marcin: The Europeanization of Political Parties: Influencing the Regulations on 
Political Finance. EUI Working Papers, 2007, No. 29. 
• Whitehead Laurence: Democratic Regions, Ostracism and Pariahs. In: Whitehead Laurence 
(ed.): The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford – 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
